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Which theories lead to a contradiction between simple reasoning principles and mod-
elling observers’ memories as physical systems? Frauchiger and Renner have shown
that this is the case for quantum theory [1]. Here we generalize the conditions of the
Frauchiger-Renner result so that they can be applied to arbitrary physical theories, and
in particular to those expressed as generalized probabilistic theories (GPTs) [2, 3]. We
then apply them to a particular GPT, box world, and find a deterministic contradiction
in the case where agents may share a PR box [4], which is stronger than the quantum
paradox, in that it does not rely on post-selection. Obtaining an inconsistency for the
framework of GPTs broadens the landscape of theories which are affected by the ap-
plication of classical rules of reasoning to physical agents. In addition, we model how
observers’ memories may evolve in box world, in a way consistent with Barrett’s criteria
for allowed operations [3, 5].
Ordinary readers, forgive my paradoxes: one must make them
when one reflects; and whatever you may say, I prefer being a
man with paradoxes than a man with prejudices.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education
1 Motivation
In order to process information and make logical inferences, we would like to be able to apply simple
reasoning principles to all situations. By this we mean that ideally we would like inferences such
as “if I know that a holds, and I know that a implies b, then I know that b holds” to be valid
independently of the nature of a and b — to take logic as a primitive that can be applied to any
physical setting. When considering scenarios with several rational agents, this extends to reasoning
about each other’s knowledge. Examples include games like poker, complex auctions, cryptographic
scenarios, and of course logical hat puzzles, where we must process complex statements of the sort
“I know that she knows that he does not know a” to keep track of the flows of knowledge.
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(a) Circuit for the Frauchiger-Renner
quantum thought experiment, where Alice
and Bob share a Hardy state [1].
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(b) Timeline for the proposed thought
experiment in box world, where agents Alice
and Bob share a PR box.
Figure 1: Protocols for multi-agent paradoxical experiments, as seen by outside ob-
servers. Two instances of thought experiments which lead to a logical contradiction: in quantum
theory and in box world. a) In the quantum case, the original experiment is formulated as a
prepare-and-measure scenario [1] but is equivalent to the version shown here. Alice and Bob share
a Hardy state, |Ψ〉PR = 1/
√
3(|00〉+ |10〉+ |11〉) where the P and R systems correspond to Alice’s
and Bob’s halves of the state respectively. They then measure their halves of the state in the Z
basis and record the outcome in their quantum memories A and B. For outside observers Ursula
and Wigner, these measurements are modelled as unitary evolutions (like the cnot gates pictured)
that correlate memory and the subsystem measured. Finally, Ursula (and Wigner) measure AP
(and RB) in the basis {|ok〉AP = 1/
√
2(|00〉AP − |11〉AP ), |fail〉AP = 1/
√
2(|00〉AP + |11〉AP )} (and
analogously defined {|ok〉RB, |fail〉RB}). After all is done, agents reason about each others’ knowl-
edge to find a contradiction. In the quantum case, this only happens if Ursula and Wigner obtain
the outcomes u = w = ok (giving the paradoxical chain u = w = ok ⇒ b = 1⇒ a = 1⇒ w = fail,
where a and b are Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes). b) In box world, Alice and Bob share a PR box and
measure their halves using some measurements labelled X = Y respectively (not to be confused
with X,Y basis measurements), updating their memories A and B. Ursula and Wigner can now
measure the joint systems AP and RB using different settings (X˜ = Y˜ = 1 = X ⊕ 1). In this case,
the contradiction can always be found independently of their outcomes (Section 4).
On the other hand, when we describe the world through physics, we would like to consider
ourselves a part of it, and in particular we would like to model our brains and memories as physical
systems described by some theory. When that theory is quantum mechanics, it turns out that
these two desiderata (applying to reason about each other’s knowledge, and modelling memories
as physical systems) are incompatible. This was first pointed out by Frauchiger and Renner, in a
thought experiment where agents who can measure each others memories (modelled as quantum
systems) and reason about shared and individual knowledge may reach contradictory conclusions
[1]. We will not review the original experiment here, apart from a very brief description in Figure 1a;
a pedagogical exposition can be found in our paper [6], but is not necessary to follow this article.
Our ultimate goal is to understand whether this incompatibility between multi-agent logic and
physics is a peculiar feature of quantum theory, or if other physical theories also admit this kind
of contradictions. If the latter is true, we would like to outline a class of theories where these
logical inconsistencies may arise. Such an analysis could help us identify the features of quantum
theory responsible for such a paradox; in particular, here we investigate the landscape of generalized
probabilistic theories [2, 3].
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Contributions of this work. In Section 2, we generalize conditions on reasoning, memories and
measurements so that they can be applied to any physical theory. The conditions can be briefly
summarized as: agents may use logic to reason about each others’ knowledge; a physical theory
allows agents to make predictions about the outcomes of measurements; and a measurement by an
agent Alice may be modelled by others as a physical evolution on her lab which preserve the infor-
mation about the original system measured (from the outside agents’ perspective). This generalizes
the von Neumann view of measurements as a unitary evolution of the system and measurement
apparatus [7]. In Section 3 we apply those conditions to the framework of generalized probabilistic
theories (GPTs) [2, 3]; in particular we introduce a way to describe an agent’s measurement from
the perspective of other agents in the particular GPT of box world. Finally, in Section 4 we derive
a logical inconsistency akin to one found in [1], using a setup where agents share a PR box, a maxi-
mally non-local resource in box world. The paradox found is stronger than the quantum one, in the
sense that it does not rely on post-selection: agents always reach a contradiction, independently of
the outcome1. A high-level circuit representation of the original experiment, as well as the PR box
version, are depicted in Figure 1.
2 Generalized reasoning, memories and measurements
Here we generalize the Frauchiger-Renner conditions for inter-agent consistency to general physical
theories. The conditions can be instantiated by each specific theory. This includes but is not limited
to theories framed in the approach of generalized probabilistic theories [2]. In some theories, like
quantum mechanics and box world (a GPT), we will find these four conditions to be incompatible,
by finding a direct contradiction in examples like the Frauchiger-Renner experiment or the PR-
box experiment described in Section 4. In other theories (like classical mechanics and Spekkens’
toy theory [10]) these four conditions may be compatible. A complete characterization of theories
where one can find these paradoxes is the subject of future work.
2.1 Reasoning about knowledge
This condition is theory-independent. It tells us that rational agents can reason about each other’s
knowledge in the usual way. This is formalized by a weaker version of epistemic modal logic, which
we explain in the following (for the full derivation of the form used here see [6]).
Let us start with a simple example. The goal of modal logic is to allow us to operate with
chained statements like “Alice knows that Bob knows that Eve doesn’t know the secret key k, and
Alice further knows that k = 1,” which can be expressed as
KA [(KB ¬KE k) ∧ k = 1],
where the operators Ki stand for “agent i knows.” If in addition Alice trusts Bob to be a rational,
reliable agent, she can deduce from the statement “I know that Bob knows that Eve doesn’t know
the key” that “I know that Eve doesn’t know the key”, and forget about the source of information
(Bob). This is expressed as
KA(KB ¬KE k) =⇒ KA ¬KE k.
1The joint state and the probability distributions of the original Frauchiger-Renner paradox are akin to those of
Hardy’s paradox [8]. For a comparison of Hardy’s paradox and PR box and why the latter allows for a contradiction
without post-selection, see [9].
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(a) An agent using deduction, applying the
distribution axiom of modal logic.
(b) An agent Ai trusts another agent Aj ,
denoted by Aj  Aj , if they take all of Aj ’s
knowledge to be true for Ai as well.
Figure 2: Agents use logic to reason. A desiderata for useful physical theories is that agents
be allowed to make deductions and transfer knowledge from one another, given a trust relation
(Definition 1). For a short review of the modal logic framework and axioms, see Appendix A.
We should also allow Alice to make deductions of the type “since Eve does not know the secret key,
and one would need to know the key in order to recover the encrypted message m, I conclude that
Eve cannot know the secret message,” which can be encoded as
KA[(¬KE k) ∧ (Ki m =⇒ Ki k, ∀ i)] =⇒ KA¬KE m.
Generalizing from this example, this gives us the following structure.
Definition 1 (Reasoning agents) An experimental setup with multiple agents A1, . . . AN can be
described by knowledge operators K1, . . .KN and statements φ ∈ Φ, such that Kiφ denotes “agent
Ai knows φ.” It should allow agents to make deductions (Figure 2a), that is
Ki[φ ∧ (φ =⇒ ψ)] =⇒ Ki ψ.
Furthermore, each experimental setup defines a trust relation between agents (Figure 2b): we
say that an agent Ai trusts another agent Aj (and denote it by Aj  Aj) iff for all statements φ,
we have
Ki(Kj φ) =⇒ Ki φ.
For the purposes of following the example of Section 4, this informal definition suffices. The full
formal version of the axioms of modal logic used here can be found in Appendix A.2
2Note that in general ‘one human 6= one agent.’ For example, consider a setting where we know that Alice’s
memory will be tampered with at time τ (much like the original Frauchiger-Renner experiment, or the sleeping
beauty paradox [11]). We can define two different agents At<τ and At>τ to represent Alice before and after the
tampering — and then for example Bob could trust pre-tampering (but not post-tampering) Alice, At<τ  B.
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Figure 3: Common knowledge. Here, a shared physical theory T is common knowledge: all
agents know that all agents know that ... (and so on) ... that theory T holds.
A note on the complexity cost of reasoning. Note that in general, even the most rational
physical agents may be limited by bounded processing power and memory, will not be able to chain
an indefinite number of deductions within sensible time scales. That is, these axioms for reasoning
are an idealization of absolutely rational agents with unbounded processing power (see [12] for an
overview of this and related issues). If we would like modal logic to apply to realistic, physical agents,
we might account for a cost (in time, or in memory) of each logical deduction, and require it to stay
below a given threshold, much like a resource theory for complexity. However, in the examples of
this paper, agents only need to make a handful of logical deductions, and these complexity concerns
do not play a significant role.
2.2 Physical theories as common knowledge
This condition is to be instantiated by each physical theory, and is the way that we incorporate the
physical theory into the reasoning framework used by agents in a given setting. If all agents use
the same theory to model the operational experiment (like quantum mechanics, special relativity,
classical statistical physics, or box world), this is included in the common knowledge shared by
the agents. For example, in the case of quantum theory, we have that “everyone knows that the
probability of obtaining outcome |x〉 when measuring a state |ψ〉 is given by |〈x|ψ〉|2, and everyone
knows that everyone knows this, and so on.”
Definition 2 (Common knowledge) We model a physical theory shared by all agents {Ai}i in a
given setting as a set T of statements that are common knowledge shared by all agents, i.e.
φ ∈ T ⇐⇒ ({Ki}i)n φ, ∀ n ∈ N,
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where ({Ki}i)n is the set of all possible sequences of n operators picked from {Ki}i. For example,
(K1 K5 K1 K2) ∈ ({Ki}i)4 and stands for “agent A1 knows that agent A5 knows that agent A1
knows that agent A2 knows.”
Note that the set T of common knowledge may include statements about the settings of the
experiment, as well as complex derivations 3. To find our paradoxical contradiction, we may only
need a very weak version of a full physical theory: for example Frauchiger and Renner only require
a possibilistic version of the Born rule, which tells us whether an outcome will be observed with
certainty [1]. This will also be the case in box world.
2.3 Agents as physical systems
In operational experiments, a reasoning agent can make statements about systems that she studies;
consequently, the theory used by the agent must be able to produce a description or a model of such
a system, namely, in terms of a set of states. For example, in quantum theory a two-state quantum
system with a ground state |0〉 and an excited state |1〉 (qubit) can be fully described by a set of
states {|ψ〉} in a Hilbert spaceH, where |ψ〉 = α|0〉+β|1〉 with α, β ∈ C and |α|2+|β|2 = 1. Another
examples of theories and respective descriptions of states of systems include: GPTs, where e.g. a
generalised bit (gbit) is a system completely characterized by two binary measurements which can
be performed on it [3] (a review of GPTs can be found in Section 3); algebraic quantum mechanics,
with states defined as linear functionals ρ : A→ C, where A is a C∗-algebra [7]; or resource theories
with some state space Ω, and epistemically defined subsystems [13, 14].
Definition 3 (Systems) Here we call a “physical system” (or simply “system”) anything that can
be an object of a physical study4. A system can be characterized, according to the theory T, by a set
of states {P iS}i∈IS (IS ⊆ N).
We have already used knowledge operators Ki to denote knowledge of each agent. Now let us
add memory to the formal description of an agent.
Definition 4 (Agents) A physical setting may be associated with a set A of agents. An agent
Ai ∈ A is described by a knowledge operator Ki ∈ KA and a physical system Mi ∈ MA, which
we call a “memory.” Each agent may study other systems according to the theory T. An agent’s
memory Mi records the results and the consequences of the studies conducted by Ai. The memory
may be itself an object of a study by other agents.
2.4 Measurements and memory update
Here we consider measurements both from the perspective of an agent who performs them, and that
of another agent who is modeling the first agent’s memory.
In an experiment involving measurements, each agent has the subjective experience of only
observing one outcome (independently of how others may model her memory), and we can see
this as the definition of a measurement: if there is no subjective experience of observing a single
outcome, we don’t call it a measurement. We can express this experience as statements such as
3One can also alternatively model a physical theory as a subset TP of the set T of common knowledge, TP ⊆ T,
in the case when details of experimental setup are not relevant to the theoretical formalism.
4We strive to be as general as possible and do not suppose or impose any structure on systems and connections
between them; in particular, we don’t make any assumptions about how composite systems are formally described in
terms of their parts.
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φ0 = “The outcome was 0, and the system is now in state |0〉.” Let us explain further after the
formal definition.
Definition 5 (Measurements) A measurement is a type of study that can be conducted by an
agent Ai, while studying a system S; the essential result of the study is the obtained “outcome”
x ∈ XS. If witnessed by another agent Aj (who knows that Ai performed the measurement but does
not know the outcome), the measurement is characterized by a set of propositions {φx} ∈ Φ, where
φx corresponds to the outcome x, satisfying:
• Kj(∃ x ∈ XS : Ki φx),
• Kj Ki φx =⇒ Kj Ki ¬(φy), ∀ y 6= x.
The first condition tells us that Aj knows that Ai must have observed one outcome, and derived all
the relevant conclusions, as expressed by one of the propositions φx. For example, if the measurement
represents a perfect Z measurement of a qubit, φ0 may include statements like “the qubit is now
in state |0〉; before the measurement it was not in state |1〉; if I measure it again in the same way,
I will obtain outcome 0;” and so on. The second condition roughly implements the experience of
observing a single outcome and trusting that information. If Ai observes x, they conclude that
the conclusions φy that they would have derived had they observed a different outcome y are not
valid. In the previous example, they would know that it does not hold φ1 = “the qubit is now in
state |1〉; before the measurement it was not in state |0〉; if I measure it again I will see outcome
1.” This condition also ensures that the conclusions {φx}x are mutually incompatible, i.e. that the
measurement is tightly characterized.
A measurement of another agent’s memory is also an example of a valid measurement. In other
words, agent Aj can choose Ai’s lab, consisting of Ai’s memory and another system S (which Ai
studies), as an object of her study.
Thus, any agent’s memory can be modelled by the other agents as a physical system undergoing
an evolution that correlates it with the measured system. In quantum theory, this corresponds to
the unitary evolution(
N−1∑
x=0
px |x〉system
)
⊗ |0〉memory →
N−1∑
x=0
px |x〉system ⊗ |x〉memory︸ ︷︷ ︸
=: |x˜〉SM
. (1)
The key aspect here is that the set of states of the joint system of observed system and memory,
{P lSM}l = span{|x〉system ⊗ |x〉memory}N−1x=0 is post-measurement isomorphic to the the set of states
{P jS}j system alone. That is, for every transformation S that you could apply to the system
before the measurement, there is a corresponding transformation SM acting on the {P lSM}l that
is operationally identical. By this we mean that an outside observer would not be able to tell if
they are operating with S on a single system before the measurement, or with SM on system and
memory after the measurement. In particular, if S is itself another measurement on S within a
probabilistic theory, it should yield the same statistics as post-measurement SM . For a quantum
example that helps clarify these notions, consider S to be a qubit initially in an arbitrary state
α|0〉S + β|1〉S . An agent Alice measures S in the Z basis and stores the outcome in her memory
A. While she has a subjective experience of seeing only one possible outcome, an outside observer
Bob could model the joint evolution of S and A as
(α|0〉S + β|1〉S)⊗ |0〉A → α|0〉S |0〉A + β|1〉S |1〉A.
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Suppose now that (before Alice’s measurement) Bob was interested in performing anX measurement
on S. This would have been a measurement with projectors {|+〉〈+|S , |−〉〈−|S}, where |±〉S =
1√
2(|0〉S ± |1〉S). However, he arrived too late: Alice has already performed her Z measurement
on S. If now Bob simply measured X on S he would obtain uniform statistics, which would be
uncorrelated with the initial state of S. So what can he do? It may not be very friendly, but he can
measure S and Alice’s memory A jointly, by projecting onto
|+〉SA = 1√2(|0〉S |0〉A + |1〉S |1〉A)
|−〉SA = 1√2(|0〉S |0〉A − |1〉S |1〉A),
which yields the same statistics of Bob’s originally planned measurement on S, had Alice not
measured it first. This equivalence should also hold in the more general case where the observed
system may have been previously correlated with some other reference system: such correlations
should be preserved in the measurement process, as modelled from the “outside” observer Bob.
There are many options to formalize this notion that “every way that an outside observer could
have manipulated the system before the measurement, he may now manipulate a subspace of ‘system
and observer’s memory,’ with the same results.” A possible simplification to restrict our options is
to take subsystems and the tensor product structure as primitives of the theory, which is the case
for GPTs [3] but not for general physical theories (like field theories; for a discussion see [14]). In the
interest of time, we will for now restrict ourselves to this case, and leave a more general formulation
of this condition as future work. For simplicity, we also restrict ourselves to information-preserving
measurements (excluding for now those where some information may have leaked to an environment
external to Alice’s memory), which are sufficient to derive the contradiction.
Definition 6 (Information-preserving memory update) Let {P jS}j be a set of states of a sys-
tem S that is being studied by an agent Ai with a memory Mi, and {P lSMi}l be a set of states of the
joint system SMi, which consists of the systems S and Mi. Then a map u : {P jS}j → {P lSMi}l is
called an information-preserving memory update if for all operations ES : {P jS}j → {P jS}j on the
system S, there exists an operation ESMi : {P lSMi}l → {P lSMi}l such that:
∀P iS ,∀Aj ∈ A Kjφ[ES(P iS)]⇒ Kjφ[ESMi ◦ u(P iS)].
See Figure 4 for an example. In general, the memory update map u need not be reversible; for
example, in box world it is an irreversible transformation, as we will see later.
Note that the characterization of measurements introduced in this section is rather minimal. In
physical theories like classical and quantum mechanics, measurements have other natural properties
that we do not require here. Two striking examples are “after her measurement, Alice’s memory
becomes correlated with the system measured in such a way that, for any subsequent operation that
Bob could perform on the system, there is an equivalent operation he may perform on her memory”
and “the correlations are such that there exists a joint operation on the system and Alice’s memory
that would allow Bob to conclude which measurement Alice performed.” While these properties
hold in the familiar classical and quantum worlds, we do not know of other physical theories where
measurements can satisfy them, and they require Bob to be able to act independently on the system
and on Alice’s memory, which may not always be possible. For example, we will see that in box
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S |ψ〉 •
A |0〉
(a) The measurement in Z basis performed by
Alice, who writes the classical result down to
her memory A.
S |ψ〉 •
A |0〉
(b) The memory update of Alice, after she
measures the system S in Z basis, as seen from
the point of view of the outside observer,
corresponding to the memory update u.
ES [Z,X]
S |ψ〉 H •
B |0〉
(c) Bob performs a measurement in the X basis
of a system S.
ESA[Z,X]
u
S |ψ〉 • • H •
A |0〉
B |0〉
(d) Bob performing a measurement in X˜ basis
of systems S and A, after Alice’s memory
update u.
Figure 4: The measurement and memory update in quantum theory from different
perspectives. From Alice’s point of view, the measurement of the system S either in Z basis
yields a classical result, which she records to her memory A, performing a classical CNOT (Figure
4a). From an outside observer, Bob’s perspective, as he is not aware of Alice’s measurement result,
the CNOT is a quantum entangling operation, which corresponds to the memory update u (Figure
4b). If he had access to the system S prior to the measurement by A, and wanted to measure it in X
basis ({|+〉S , |−〉S}), he would have to perform an operation ES [Z,X] (and then copy the classical
result into his memory B) (Figure 4c). If the system S was initially in a state |ψ〉 = |+〉S , then
a proposition which would correspond to this operation is φ[ES [Z,X](|ψ〉S)] = “s = +”. However,
if the measurement in Z is already performed by A and the result is written to her memory, the
whole process described by Bob as a memory update u, and in order to comply his initial wish
to measure S only, he can perform an operation ESA[Z,X] on S and A together instead, which is
a measurement in {|+〉SA, |−〉SA} basis (Figure 4d). A proposition which this operation yields is
φ[ESMi ◦ u(|φ〉S)] = “sa = +” (as |ξ〉SA = |+〉SA), which naturally follows from “s = +”, given the
structure of the memory update u.
world, these two subsystems become superglued after Alice’s measurement, and that Bob only has
access to them as a whole and not as individual components. As such, we will not require these
properties out of measurements, for now. We revisit this discussion in Section 5.
3 Box world: states and memories
Generalised probabilistic theories [2, 3] (GPTs) provide an an operational framework for describing
probabilistic theories, including classical and quantum theories where the physical systems are taken
as black boxes, characterized only by their input and output behaviour. The state of a system is
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represented by a probability vector P that encodes the probabilities of possible outcomes given all
the possible choices of measurement. This is a single-shot characterization of a system: the post-
measurement state can be represented by a new probability vector, and the update rules depend on
the specific theory.
In this paper, we employ the framework for information processing in GPTs presented by Barrett
in [3], and use we the term “box world” to denote the set of theories that Barrett originally calls
Generalised No-Signalling Theories. We will derive the paradox in box world, which is a particular
instance of a GPT. However, the general assumptions proposed in Section 2 can also be applied to
more general GPTs that do not obey the standard no signalling principle [15, 16] or that which obey
different physical principles. We present here the minimal formalism needed to follow the argument;
see Appendix B for more details.
3.1 States and operations (review)
Individual states. The so-called generalised bit or gbit is a system completely characterized
by two binary measurements which can be performed on it [3]. Such sets of measurements that
completely characterise the state of a system are known as fiducial measurements. The state of a
gbit is thus fully specified by the vector
Pgbit =

P (a = 0|X = 0)
P (a = 1|X = 0)
P (a = 0|X = 1)
P (a = 1|X = 1)
 , (2)
where X = 0 and X = 1 represent the two choices of measurements and a ∈ {0, 1} are the possible
outcomes (Figure 5a). Analogously, a classical bit is a system characterized by a single binary
fiducial measurement,
Pbit =
(
P (a = 0|X = 0)
P (a = 1|X = 0)
)
, (3)
and, in quantum theory, a qubit is characterized by three fiducial measurements (corresponding,
for example, to three directions X, Y and Z in the Bloch sphere),
Pqubit =

P (a = 0|X = 0)
P (a = 1|X = 0)
P (a = 0|X = 1)
P (a = 1|X = 1)
P (a = 0|X = 2)
P (a = 1|X = 2)

. (4)
For normalized states, we have |P| = ∑i P (a = i|X = j) = 1,∀ j. The set of possible states of
a gbit is convex, with extremes
P00 =

1
0
1
0
 , P01 =

1
0
0
1
 , P10 =

0
1
1
0
 , P11 =

0
1
0
1
 . (5)
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X a
(a) G-bit. A gbit is a function with
binary input and output,
characterized by the probability
vector Pgbit, also called the state
vector.
X a
Y b
(b) PR box. The PR box has two binary inputs X,Y and two
binary outputs a, b, satisfying XY = a⊕ b, and otherwise
uniformly random (state vector on the right). Usually it is
applied in the context of two space-like separated agents, each
providing one of the inputs and obtaining the respective output.
The box is non-signalling, and maximally violates the CHSH
inequality [4].
Figure 5: Boxes in Generalized Probabilistic Theories. The modular objects of GPTs are in-
put/output functions depicted as boxes and characterized by probability vectors. Each function (or
box) can be evaluated once, and it may or not correspond to a physical system being probed; even
if it is, nothing is assumed about the post-evalutation state of the system (unlike quantum theory,
which specifies the post-measurement state of a system given its initial state and the measurement
device).
These correspond to pure states. In the qubit case, the extremes correspond to all the points on
the surface of the Bloch sphere, for example
P|+〉 =

1
0
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2

, P|−〉 =

0
1
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2

, P|0〉 =

1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1
0

P|1〉 =

1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
0
1

. (6)
Note that in box world, pure gbits are deterministic for both alternative measurements, whereas
in quantum theory at most one fiducial measurement can be deterministic for each pure qubit, as
reflected by uncertainty relations. We denote the set of allowed states of a system A by SA.
Composite states. The state of a bipartite system AB, denoted by PAB ∈ SAB can be written
in the form PAB = ∑i ri PAi ⊗ PBi where ri are real coefficients5 and PAi ∈ SA, PBi ∈ SB can
5Note that it is not necessary that the coefficients ri be positive and sum to one. If this is the case, then the
composite state would be separable and hence local, otherwise, the state is entangled [3].
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b
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o
a
Figure 6: Bipartitite measurements in boxworld. Any bipartite measurement on a 2-gbit box
world system can be decomposed into a procedure (or convex combinations thereof) of the following
form. Alice first performs a measurement X on one of the gbits (labelled A), and forwards the
outcome a to Bob. Bob then performs a measurement Y = f1(a), which may depend on a, on the
other gbit (labelled B), obtaining the outcome b. The final measurement outcome o of the joint
measurement can be computed by Bob as a function f2(a, b). All allowed bipartite measurements
are convex combinations of this type of classical wirings [3].
be taken to be pure and normalised states of the individual systems A and B [3]. Thus, a general
2-gbit state PAB2 can be written as in Figure 5b (left), where X,Y ∈ {0, 1} are the two fiducial
measurements on the first and second gbit and a, b ∈ {0, 1} are the corresponding measurement
outcomes. The PR box PPR, on the right, is an example of such a 2 gbit state that is valid in box
world, which satisfies the condition a⊕ b = xy [4].
State transformations. Valid operations are represented as matrices that transform valid state
vectors to valid state vectors (Appendix B). In addition, we only have access to the (single-shot)
input/output behaviour of systems, so in practice all valid operations in box world take the form of
classical wirings between boxes, which correspond to pre- and post-processing of input and output
values, and convex combinations thereof [3]. For example, bipartite joint measurements on a 2-gbit
system can be decomposed into convex combinations of classical “wirings”, as shown in Figure 6.
In contrast, quantum theory allows for a richer structure of bipartite measurements by allowing
for entangling measurements (e.g. in the Bell basis), which cannot be decomposed into classical
wirings. Bipartite transformations on multi-gbit systems turn out to be classical wirings as well [3].
Reversible operations in particular consist only of trivial wirings: local operations and permutations
of systems [5]. One cannot perform entangling operations such as a coherent copy (the quantum
CNOT gate) [3, 17], which is required in the original version of the Frauchiger-Renner experiment.
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X a
P((x’, a’)| y) = δx,x’ δa,a’
Figure 7: Measurement: observer’s perspective. An agent Alice measures a system with
measurement setting X, and obtains outcome a with a given probability. In the language of GPTs
this corresponds to running the box that encodes the measurement statistics. Alice may then the
measurement data (input and output) to memory. If this is a classical memory, like a notebook,
the procedure corresponds to preparing a new box (to be run later by herself), which outputs the
pair (X, a) deterministically.
3.2 Agents, memory and measurement in box world
We will now instantiate our general conditions for agents, memories and measurements (definitions
definitions 4 to 6) in box world. As there is no physical theory for the dynamics behind box
world, there is plenty of freedom in the choice of implementation. In principle each such choice
could represent a different physical theory leading to the same black-box behaviour in the limit of
a single agent with an implicit memory. This is analogous to the way in which different versions
of quantum theory (Bohmian mechanics, collapse theories, unitary quantum mechanics with von
Neumann measurements) result in the same effective theory in that limit.
Definition 7 (Agents in box world) Let T be the theory that describes box world, according
to [3]. As per definition 4, an agent Ai ∈ A is described by a knowledge operator Ki ∈ KA and a
physical memory Mi ∈MA.
We will focus on the case where the memory consists of bit or gbits. Each agent may study other
systems according to the theory T. An agent’s memory records the results and the consequences of
the studies conducted by them, and may be an object of a study by other agents.
It is worth mentioning that boxes do not correspond to physical systems, but to input/output
functions that can only be evaluated once. As such, the post-measurement state of a physical system
is described by a whole new box. The notion of an individual system itself, as we will see, may be
unstable under measurements — some measurements glue the system to the observer’s memory, in
a way that makes individual access to the original system impossible.
Measurement: observer’s perspective. From the point of view of the observer who is measur-
ing (say Alice), making a measurement on a system corresponds simply to running the box whose
state vector encodes the measurement statistics. Alice may then commit the result of her measure-
ment to a physical memory, like a notebook where she writes ‘I measured observable X and obtained
outcome a.’ To be useful, this should be a memory that may be consulted later, i.e. it could receive
13
Ursula runs the box 
at time t=3
a
box
for 
Ursula
Alice’s memory update
(as seen by Ursula, at time t=1)
♥
(a) Generally, in GPTs with some notion of
subsystems, Ursula can think of the physical
system measured by Alice, and Alice’s memory
pre-measurement as two boxes, which Ursula
could in principle run if Alice chose not to
measure (left). From Ursula’s perspective,
Alice’s measurement corresponds to some
transformation that results on a final state on
which Ursula can later act. This final state can
be represented by a new box available to
Ursula, which will have in principle a different
behaviour, depending on the concrete physical
theory.
Alice’s memory update
(as seen by Ursula, at time t=1)
(b) In box world, if the two initial systems
correspond to small gbit boxes, and Alice’s
memory is initialized as shown, and if we want
to preserve the global system dimensions, then
the rules for allowed transformations limit the
statistics of Ursula’s final box to be of the form
shown in the right (Appendix C). The asterisks
represent arbitrary values, which will depend on
the choice of implementation of Alice’s
measurement. This transformation is in
principle non-reversible: note that in the final
box, Ursula cannot address system and memory
independently, but only the global, superglued
box.
Figure 8: Memory update after a measurement: an outsider’s perspective. Here Alice
makes a measurement of a system (blue, top) at time t = 1 and stores her outcome in her mem-
ory (pink, bottom). The question is how an outsider, Ursula, models Alice’s measurement. In
particular, what can Ursula do with the post-measurement state?
an input Y =‘open and read the memory’, and output the pair (X, a). In the language of GPTs,
this means that Alice, from her own perspective, prepares a new box with one input Y and two
outputs (X ′, a′), with the behaviour P((X ′, a′)|Y ) = δX,X′δa,a′ , which depends on her observations
(Figure 7). She may later run this box (look at her notebook) and recover the measurement data.
The exact dimension of the box will depend on how Alice perceives and models her own memory;
for example it could consist of two bits, or two gbits, or, if we think that before the measurement
she stored the information about the choice of observable elsewhere, it could be a single bit or gbit
encoding only the outcome. We leave this open for now, as we do not want to constrain the theory
too much at this stage.
Measurements: inferences. To see the kind of inferences and conclusions that an agent can
take from a measurement in box world, it’s convenient to look at the example where Alice and Bob
share a PR box. Suppose that Alice measured her half of the box with input X = 1 and obtained
outcome a = 0. From the PR correlations, XY = a ⊕ b, she can conclude that if Bob measures
Y = 0, he must obtain b = 0, and if he measures Y = 1, he must obtain b = 1. This is independent
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Ursula’s box
(prepared by Alice at time t=1)
0
or
(a) From Ursula’s perspective, Alice has
not yet run the boxes corresponding to the
system measured and her memory; she
simply wired the outputs of the two boxes
with a controlled-not gate, so that the
measurement output is copied to the
output of the memory. This is analogous
to the quantum case, where from Ursula’s
view Alice has not performed a projective
measurement, but simply entangled
system and memory. When Ursula later
runs the outer green box, she provides two
inputs, which go through the circuit
shown, resulting in two identical outputs.
0
or
0
X a
~ ~
(b) In order for the model to be
information-preserving, we need Ursula to be able to
do some pre- and post-processing (outer pink box),
such that the final box has the same behaviour as the
initial state of the system measured by Alice (inner
blue box on top). This is achieved, for example, by
Ursula fixing her second input to 0, and undoing the
controlled-not gate at the end, discarding the second
(trivial) output. The result is a box with binary
input X˜ and binary output a˜, which has the desired
behaviour. This property carries on to bipartite
scenarios where Alice measures half of a joint state.
Figure 9: Information-preserving memory update. This (trivial) physical implementation of
Alice’s measurement in box world satisfies the conditions of Figure 8b and is information-preserving,
in the sense that an external agent, Ursula, can run the final box as if it were the original, pre-
measurement state of the system that Alice measured, in analogy to the quantum case (Figure 4).
The crucial detail is that Ursula is not allowed to open her box (in green) and access the circuitry
inside. Note that there are other possibilities for modelling measurements — this is the simplest
one that still allows us to derive the paradox. For example, the choice of keeping two binary inputs
in Ursula’s box and discarding the second one (replacing it with 0) is an arbitrary one, picked for
simplicity. Details and proofs in Appendix C.
of whether Bob’s measurement happens before or after Alice (or even space-like separated). She
could reach similar deterministic conclusions for her other choice of measurement and possible
outcomes. In the language of Definition 5, we have
φX=0,a=0 = “[Y = 0 =⇒ b = 0] ∧ [Y = 1 =⇒ b = 0]”,
φX=0,a=1 = “[Y = 0 =⇒ b = 1] ∧ [Y = 1 =⇒ b = 1]”,
φX=1,a=0 = “[Y = 0 =⇒ b = 0] ∧ [Y = 1 =⇒ b = 1]”,
φX=1,a=1 = “[Y = 0 =⇒ b = 1] ∧ [Y = 1 =⇒ b = 0]”.
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Measurement: memory update from an outsider’s perspective. Next we need to model
how an outsider agent, Ursula, models Alice’s measurement, in the case where Alice does not
communicate her outcome to Ursula.6 Suppose that all agents share a time reference frame, and
Alice makes her measurement at time t = 1. From Ursula’s perspective, in the most general case, this
will correspond to Alice preparing a new box, with some number of inputs and outputs, which Ursula
can later run (Figure 8a). The exact form of this box will depend on the underlying physical theory
for measurements: in the quantum case it corresponds to a box with the measurement statistics of
a state that’s entangled between the system measured and Alice’s memory, as we saw. In classical
mechanics, it will correspond to perfect classical correlations between those two subsystems. In a
theory of very destructive measurements, it could be that Alice’s post-measurement state is trivial
from the point of view of Ursula and the resulting box is void. Now suppose that we would like to
have a physical theory where the dimension of systems is preserved by measurements: for example,
if the system that Alice measures is instantiated by a box with binary input and output (e.g. a gbit,
or half of a PR-box), and Alice’s memory, where she stores the outcome of the measurement (as in
Figure 7) is also represented as a gbit, then we would want the post-measurement box accessible to
Ursula to have in total two binary inputs and two binary outputs (or more generally, four possible
inputs and four possible outputs). Note that this is not a required condition for a theory to be
physical per se — it is just a familiar rule of thumb that gives some persistent meaning to the
notion of subsystems and dimensions. In such a theory that supports box world correlations, we
find that the allowed statistics of Ursula’s box must satisfy the conditions of Figure 8b (proof in
Appendix C). These conditions still leave us some wiggle room for possible different implementations.
Measurements: information-preserving memory update. In order to find a multi-agent
paradox, we will need a model of memory update that is information-preserving, in the sense of
Definition 6. This does not imply that Alice’s transformation (as seen by Ursula) be reversible: in
fact, it will glue two subsystems such that Ursula will only be able to address them as a whole, but
the relevant fact is that Ursula can apply some post-processing in order to obtain a new box with
the same behaviour as the pre-measurement system that Alice observed. In Figure 9 we give an
example of a model that satisfies these conditions, in addition to the conditions of Figure 8b. As
we foreshadowed, this model is not completely satisfying from a physical standpoint: it looks rather
trivial (a post-processing of classical outputs); the super-gluing is postulated rather than naturally
emergent; and, unlike quantum von-Neumann measurements, it does not give Ursula information
about the nature of Alice’s measurement. It helps to think of it as one minimal implementation
among many possible, which already allows us to derive a paradox. We discuss these limitations and
alternatives in Section 5.2. What is important here (and proven in Appendix C) is that this model
generalizes to the case where Alice measures half of a bipartite state, like a PR box. That is, suppose
that Alice and Bob share a PR box. Imagine that at time t = 1 Alice makes her measurement X,
obtaining (from her perspective) an outcome a, and that Bob makes his measurement Y at time
t = 2, obtaining outcome b. As usual, if Alice and Bob were to communicate at this point, they
would find thatXY = a⊕b, and indeed the propositions φX,a and φY,b that represent their subjective
measurement experience would hold. But now suppose that Alice and Bob do not get the chance
to communicate and compare their input and outputs; instead, at time t = 3, an observer Ursula,
6Naming convention: as we will see in Section 4, in the proposed experiment we have two “internal” agents, Alice
and Bob, who will in turn be measured by two “external” agents, Ursula and Wigner respectively. Ursula is named
after Le Guin. In the example of Section 2 the internal agent was Alice and the external Bob, so that their different
pronouns could help keep track of whose memory we were referring to, but we trust that the reader has got a handle
on it by now.
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who models Alice’s measurement as in Figure 9a, runs the box corresponding to Alice’s half of the
PR box and Alice’s memory, and applies the post-processing of Figure 9b. Ursula’s input is X˜ and
her output is a˜. Then the claim is that X˜Y = a˜⊕ b: that is, Ursula and Bob effectively share a PR
box. This is proven in Appendix C. We now have all the ingredients needed to find a multi-agent
epistemic paradox in box world.
4 Finding the paradox
In this section we find a scenario in box world where reasoning, physical agents reach a logical
paradox. We compare it to the result to the contradiction obtained by Frauchiger and Renner [1]
in the next section.
Experimental setup. The proposed thought experiment is similar in spirit to the one proposed
by Frauchiger and Renner [1] (recall Figure 1). Alice and Bob share a PR box (the corresponding
box world state is given in Figure 5b); they each will measure their half of the PR box and store
the outcomes in their local memories. Let Alice’s lab be located inside the lab of another agent,
Ursula’s lab such that Ursula can now perform joint measurements on Alice’s system (her half of
the PR box) and memory, as seen in the previous section. Similarly, let Bob’s lab be located inside
Wigner’s lab, such that Wigner can perform joint measurements on Bob’s system and memory. We
assume that Alice’s and Bob’s labs are isolated such that no information about their measurement
outcomes leaks out. The protocol, as shown in Figure 1b, is the following:
t=1 Alice measures her half of the PR box, with measurement setting X, and stores the outcome
a in her memory A.
t=2 Bob measures his half of the PR box, with measurement setting Y , and stores the outcome b
in his memory B.
t=3 Ursula measures the box corresponding to Alice’s lab (as in Figure 9b), with measurement
setting X˜ = X ⊕ 1, obtaining outcome a˜.
t=4 Wigner measures the box corresponding to Bob’s lab, with measurement setting Y˜ = Y ⊕ 1,
obtaining outcome b˜.
Agents can agree on their measurement settings beforehand, but should not communicate once
the experiment begins. The trust relation, which specifies which agents consider each other to be
rational agents (as opposed to mere physical systems), is
At=1,2! Bt=1,2
Bt=2,3! Ut=3
Ut=3,4!Wt=4
Wt=4! At=1.
The common knowledge T shared by all four agents includes the PR box correlations, the way the
external agents model Alice and Bob’s measurements, and the trust structure above.
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Reasoning. Now the agents can reason about the events in other agents’ labs. We take here the
example where the measurement settings are X = Y = 0, X˜ = Y˜ = 1, and where Wigner obtained
the outcome b˜ = 0; the reasoning is analogous for the remaining cases.
1. Wigner reasons about Ursula’s outcome. At time t = 4, Wigner knows that, by virtue of their
information-preserving modelling of Alice and Bob’s measurements, he and Ursula effectively
shared a PR box 7. He can therefore use the PR correlations X˜Y˜ = a˜ ⊕ b˜ to conclude that
Ursula’s output must be 1,
KW (b˜ = 0 =⇒ a˜ = 1).
2. Wigner reasons about Ursula’s reasoning. Now Wigner thinks about what Ursula may have
concluded regarding Bob’s outcome. He knows that at time t = 3, Ursula and Bob effectively
shared a PR box7, satisfying X˜Y = a˜⊕ b, and that therefore Ursula must have concluded
KWKU (a˜ = 1 =⇒ b = 1).
3. Wigner reasons about Ursula’s reasoning about Bob’s reasoning. Next, Wigner wonders “What
could Ursula, at time t = 3, conclude about Bob’s reasoning at time t = 2?" Well, Wigner
knows that she knows that Bob knew that at time t = 2 he effectively shared a PR box with
Alice, satisfying XY = a⊕ b, and therefore concludes
KWKUKB(b = 1 =⇒ a = 1).
4. Wigner reasons about Ursula’s reasoning about Bob’s reasoning about Alice’s reasoning. We
are almost there. Now Wigner thinks about Alice’s perspective at time t = 1, through the
lenses of Bob (at time t = 2) and Ursula (t = 3). Back then, Alice knew that she obtained some
outcome a, and that Wigner would model Bob’s measurement in an information-preserving
way, such that Alice (at time t = 1) and Wigner (of time t = 4) share an effective PR box7,
satisfying XY˜ = a⊕ b˜, which results, in particular, in
KWKUKBKA(a = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 1).
5. Wigner applies trust relations. In order to combine the statements obtained above, we need
to apply the trust relations described above, starting from the inside of each proposition, for
example,
KWKUKBKA(a = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 1)
=⇒ KWKUKB(a = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 1) [A B]
=⇒ KWKU (a = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 1) [B  U ]
=⇒ KW (a = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 1), [U  W ]
and similarly for the other statements, so that we obtain
KW
[
(b˜ = 0 =⇒ a˜ = 1) ∧ (a˜ = 1 =⇒ b = 1) ∧ (b = 1 =⇒ a = 1) ∧ (a = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 1)]
=⇒ KW (b˜ = 0 =⇒ b˜ = 1).
7See Appendix C for a proof.
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We could have equally taken the point of view of any other observer, and from any particular
outcome or choice of measurement, and through similar reasoning chains reached the following
contradictions,
KA[(a = 0 =⇒ a = 1) ∧ (a = 1 =⇒ a = 0)],
KB[(b = 0 =⇒ b = 1) ∧ (b = 1 =⇒ b = 0)],
KU [(a˜ = 0 =⇒ a˜ = 1) ∧ (a˜ = 1 =⇒ a˜ = 0)],
KW [(b˜ = 0 =⇒ b˜ = 1) ∧ (b˜ = 1 =⇒ b˜ = 0)].
5 Discussion
We have generalized the conditions of the Frauchiger-Renner theorem and made them applicable
to arbitrary physical theories, including the framework of generalized probability theories. We then
applied these conditions to the GTP of box world and found an experimental setting that leads to
a multi-agent epistemic paradox.
5.1 Comparison with the quantum thought experiment
We showed that box world agents reasoning about each others’ knowledge can come to a deter-
ministic contradiction, which is stronger than the original paradox, as it can be reached without
post-selection, from the point of view of every agent and for any measurement outcome obtained
by them.
Strong contextuality and post-selection. In contrast to the original Frauchiger-Renner ex-
periment of [1], no post-selection was required to arrive at this contradictory chain of statements
as, in fact, all the implications above are symmetric, for example
a˜ = 0 ⇐⇒ b = 0 ⇐⇒ a = 0 ⇐⇒ b˜ = 0 ⇐⇒ a˜ = 1.
As a result, one can arrive at a similar (symmetric) paradoxical chain of statements irrespective of
the choice of agent and outcome for the first statement. In other words, irrespective of the outcomes
observed by every agent, each agent will arrive at a contradiction when they try to reason about the
outcomes of other agents. This is because, as shown in [9], the PR box exhibits strong contextuality
and no global assignments of outcome values for all four measurements exists for any choice of
local assignments. In contrast, the original paradox of [1] admits the same distribution as that of
Hardy’s paradox [8]. It is shown in [9] that this distribution is an example of logical contextuality
where for a particular choice of local assignments (the ones that are post-selected on in the original
Frauchiger-Renner experiment), a global assignment of values compatible with the support of the
distribution fails to exist, but this is not true for all local assignments. This makes the paradox
even stronger in box world, since it can be found without post-selection and by any of the agents,
for any outcome that they observe. In particular, the paradox would already arise in a single run
of the experiment. For a simple method to enumerate all possible contradictory statements that
the agents may make, see the analysis of the PR box presented in [9]. A detailed analysis of the
relation between Frauchiger-Renner type paradoxes and contextuality will appear in future work.
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Communication vs prepare-and-measure. One might note that a distinction between our
proposal and the original Frauchiger-Renner experiment is that there is no communication between
Alice and Bob in our PR box version. However, the original quantum scenario can be replaced
by a protocol where Alice and Bob receive an appropriately prepared quantum state and perform
measurements on it without communicating to each other, and the original paradox would still hold
in such a case (Figure 1a).
5.2 Physical measurements in box world
Since we lack a physical theory to explain how measurements and transformations are instantiated
for generalised non-signalling boxes, and only have access to their input/output behaviour, all al-
lowed transformations consist of pre- and post-processing. In the quantum case, we have in addition
to a description of possible input-output correlations, a mathematical framework for the underlying
states producing those correlations, the theory of von-Neumann measurements and transformations
as CPTP maps. In Appendix D we briefly show how we one could in principle model the quantum
memory updates in the framework of GPTs. In box world, introduction of dynamical features (for
example, a memory update algorithm) is less intuitive and requires additional constructions. In the
following, we outline the main limitations we found.
Systems vs boxes. In quantum theory, a system corresponds to a physical substrate that can be
acted on more than once. For example, Alice could measure a spin first in the Z basis and then in X
basis (obviously with different results than if she had measured first X and then Z). The predictions
for each subsequent measurement are represented by a different box in the GPT formalism, such
that each box encodes the current state of the system in terms of the measurement statistics of a
tomographically complete set of measurements. After each measurement, the corresponding box
disappears, but quantum mechanics gives us a rule to compute the post-measurement state of the
underlying system, which in turn specifies the box for future measurements. On the other hand,
the default theory for box world lacks the notion of underlying physical systems and a definite rule
to compute the post-measurement vector state of something that has been measured once. Indeed,
Equations 9a-9c (Appendix B) tell us that post-measurement states is only partially specified: for
instance, if the measurement performed was fiducial, we know that the block corresponding to
that measurement in the post-measurement state would have a “1” corresponding to the outcome
obtained and “0” for all other outcomes in the block. However, we still have freedom in defining the
entries in the remaining blocks. Our model proposes a possible physical mechanism for updating
boxes (which could be read as updating the state of the underlying system), but so far only for
the case where we compare the perspectives of different agents, and we leave it open whether Alice
has a subjective update rule that would allow her to make subsequent measurements on the same
physical system.
Verifying a measurement. In our simple model, the external observer Ursula has no way to
know which measurement Alice performed, or whether she measured anything at all — the connec-
tion between Alice’s and Ursula’s views is postulated rather than derived from a physical theory.
Indeed, Alice could have simply wired the boxes as in Figure 9a without actually performing the
measurement, and Ursula will not know the difference: she obtains the same joint state of Alice’s
memory and the system she measured. In contrast, consider the case of quantum mechanics with
standard von Neumann measurements. There, Alice’s memory gets entangled with the system, and
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the post-measurement state depends on the basis in which Alice measured her system. For example,
if Alice’s qubit S starts off in the normalised pure state |ψ〉 = α|0〉S + β|1〉S and her memory M
initialised to |0〉M , the initial state of her system and memory from Ursula’s perspective is |Ψ〉inSM =
[α|0〉S+β|1〉S ]⊗|0〉M = [(α+β√2 )|+〉S+(
α−β√
2 )|−〉S)]⊗|0〉M If Alice measures the system in the Z basis,
the post-measurement state from Ursula’s perspective is |Ψ〉out,ZSM = α|0〉S |0〉M + β|1〉S |1〉M , which
is an entangled state. If instead, Alice measured in the Hadamard (X) basis, the post-measurement
state would be |Ψ〉out,XSM = (α+β√2 )|+〉S |0〉M + (
α−β√
2 )|−〉S |1〉M . Clearly the measurement statistics of
|Ψ〉inSM , |Ψ〉out,ZSM and |Ψ〉out,XSM are different and Ursula can thus (in principle, with some probability)
tell whether or not Alice performed a measurement and which measurement was performed by her.
In the absence of a physical theory backing box world, we can still lift this degenerancy between
the three situations (Alice didn’t measure, she measured X = 0, or she measured X = 1) by adding
another classical system to the circuitry of 9a: for example, a trit that stores what Alice did, and
which Ursula could consult independently of the glued box of system and Alice’s memory. However,
we’d still have a postulated connection between what’s stored in this trit and what Alice actually
did, and not one that is physically motivated.
Supergluing of non-signalling boxes. For the memory update circuit (from Ursula’s per-
spective) of Figure 9a, and the initial state of Equation 10, the final state would be PSMfin =
(p 0 0 1− p|p 0 0 1− p|q 0 0 1− q|q 0 0 1− q)TSM . Note that while the reduced
final state of S does not depend on the input X ′ toM , the reduced final state on Alice’s memoryM ,
PMfin clearly depends on the input X of the system S if p 6= q. If X = 0, PMfin = (p 1−p|p 1−p)T
and if X = 1, PMfin = (q 1 − q|q 1 − q)T , i.e., the systems S and M are signalling. This is ex-
pected since there is clearly a transfer of information from S to M during the measurement as seen
in Figure 6. However, this means that the state PSMfin is not a valid box world state of 2 systems S
and M but a valid state of a single system SM i.e., after Alice performs her wiring/measurement,
it is not possible to physically separate Alice’s system S from her memory M from Ursula’s per-
spective. For if this were possible, there would be a violation of the no-signalling principle and
the notion of relativistic causality. In quantum theory, on the other hand it is always possible to
perform separate measurements on Alice’s system and her memory even after she measures. We
call this feature supergluing of post-measurement boxes, where it is no longer possible for Ursula
to separately measure S or M , but she can only jointly measure SM as though it were a single
system. Note that this is only the case for p 6= q and in our example with the PR-box (Section 4),
p = q = 1/2 and PSMfin remains a valid bipartite non-signalling state in this particular, fine-tuned
case of the PR box.
A glass half full. The above-mentioned features of the memory update in box world are cer-
tainly not desirable, and not what one would expect to find in a physical theory with meaningful
notions of subsystems. An optimistic way to look at these limitations is to see them as providing
us with further intuition for why PR boxes have not yet been found in nature. One of the main
contributions of this paper is the finding that despite these peculiar features of box world and the
fact that it has no entangling bipartite joint measurements (a crucial step in the original quantum
paradox), a consistent outside perspective of the memory update exists such that with our gener-
alised assumptions, a multi-agent paradox can be recovered. This indicates that the reversibility of
measurements is not crucial to derive this kind of paradox.
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Other models for physical measurements. Ours is not the first attempt at coming up with a
(partial) physical theory that reproduces the statistics of box world. Here we review the approach
of Skrzypczyk et al. in [18]. There the authors consider a variation of box world that has a reduced
set of physical states (which the authors call genuine), which consists of the PR box and all the
deterministic local boxes. The wealth of box world state vectors (i.e. the non-signalling polytope,
or what we could call epistemic states) is recovered by allowing classical processing of inputs and
outputs via classical wirings, as well as convex combinations thereof. In contrast, box world takes
all convex combinations of maximally non-signalling boxes (of which the PR box is an example) to
be genuine physical states; this becomes relevant as we require the allowed physical operations to
map such states to each other. For the restricted state space of [18], the set of allowed combinations
is larger than in box world, particularly for multipartite settings. For example, there we are allowed
maps that implement the equivalent of entanglement swapping: if Bob shares a PR box with Alice,
and another with Charlie, there is an allowed map that he can apply on his two halves which
leaves Alice and Charlie sharing a PR box, with some probability. It would be interesting to try to
model memory update in this modified theory, to see if (1) there is a more natural implementation
of measurements within the extended set of operations, and (2) whether this theory allows for
multi-agent paradoxes.
5.3 Characterization of general theories
While we have shown that a consistency paradox, similar to the one arising in the Frauchiger-
Renner setup, can also be adapted for the box world in terms of GPTs, it still remains unclear how
to characterize all possible theories where it is possible to find a setup leading to a contradiction.
Essentially, one has to restrict the class of such theories and identify the properties of these theories
that make such paradoxes possible.
Beyond standard composition of systems. Additionally, it is still an open problem to find an
operational way to state the outside view of measurements (and a memory update operation), for
theories without a prior notion of subsystems and a tensor rule for composing them. This will allow
us to search for multi-agent logical paradoxes in field theories, for example. One possible direction
is to use notions of effective and subjective locality, as outlined for example in [14].
Relation to contextuality. In [9] Abramsky et al explore relations between logical paradoxes
and quantum contextuality; in particular, they point out a direct connection between contextuality
and a type of classic semantic paradoxes called “Liar cycles”[19]. A Liar cycle of length N is a chain
of statements of the form:
φ1 = “φ2 is true′′, φ2 = “φ3 is true′′, . . . , φN−1 = “φN is true′′, φN = “φ1 is false′′. (7)
It can be shown that the patterns of reasoning which are used in finding a contradiction in the chain
of statements above are similar to the reasoning we make use of in FR-type arguments, and can
also be connected to the cases of PR box (which corresponds to a Liar cycle of length 4) or Hardy’s
paradox. This might imply that multi-agent paradoxes are linked to the notion of contextuality.
Another central ingredient seems to be information-preserving models for physical measurements,
which allow us to replace counter-factuals with actual measurements, performed in sequence by
different agents. We leave a deeper investigation of these connections further to future work.
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Appendix
A Modal logic
Here we shortly sum up the important features of modal logic. Importantly, modal logic applies to
most classical multi-agent setups, and simply provides a compact mathematical way to capture the
intuitive laws commonly used for reasoning.
A.1 Kripke structures
In modal logic, a set Σ of possible states (or alternatives, or worlds) is introduced [20]: for example,
in a world s1 the key value is k = 1 and Eve does not know it, and in a state s2 Eve could know
that k = 0. The truth value of a proposition φ is then assigned depending on the possible world in
Σ, and can differ from one possible world to another. In order to formalize the simple rules agents
use for reasoning, we will first provide a structure which serves as a complete picture of the setup
the agents are in, and then discuss the elements of the structure.
Definition 8 (Kripke structure) A Kripke structure M for n agents over a set of statements
Φ is a tuple 〈Σ, pi,K1, ...,Kn〉 where Σ is a non-empty set of states, or possible worlds, pi is an
interpretation, and Ki is a binary relation on Σ.
The interpretation pi is a map pi : Σ × Φ → {true, false}, which defines a truth value of a
statement φ ∈ Φ in a possible world s ∈ Σ.
Ki is a binary equivalence relation on a set of states Σ, where (s, t) ∈ Ki if agent i considers
world t possible given his information in the world s.
The truth assignment tells us if the proposition φ ∈ Φ is true or false in a possible world s ∈ Σ;
for example, if φ = “Alice has a secret key,” and s is a world where there is an individual named
Alice who indeed possesses a secret key, then pi(s, φ) = true. The truth value of a statement in
a given structure M might vary from one possible world to another; we will denote that φ is true
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in world s of a structure M by (M, s) |= φ, and |= φ will mean that φ is true in any world s of a
structure M .
A.2 Axioms of knowledge (weak version)
In order to operate the statements agents produce, we have to establish certain rules which are
used to compress or judge the statements. These are the axioms of knowledge [21]. They might
seem trivial in the light of our everyday reasoning, yet given our awareness of the quantum case, we
will treat them carefully. Here we present the reader with a weaker version of the axioms (which
includes Trust axiom) that we have developed in previous work [6].
Distribution axiom allows agents combine statement which contain inferences:
Axiom 1 (Distribution axiom.) If an agent is aware of a fact φ and that a fact ψ follows from
φ, then the agent can conclude that ψ holds:
(M, s) |= (Kiφ ∧Ki(φ⇒ ψ))⇒ (M, s) |= Kiψ.
Knowledge generalization rule permits agents use commonly shared knowledge:
Axiom 2 (Knowledge generalization rule.) All agents know all the propositions that are valid
in a structure:
if (M, s) |= φ ∀s then |= Kiφ ∀i.
Positive and negative introspection axioms highlight the ability of an agent to reflect upon her
knowledge:
Axiom 3 (Positive and negative introspection axioms.) Agents can perform introspection re-
garding their knowledge:
(M, s) |= Kiφ⇒ (M, s) |= KiKiφ (Positive Introspection),
(M, s) |= ¬Kiφ⇒ (M, s) |= Ki¬Kiφ (Negative Introspection).
We also equip the logical skeleton of the setting with so-called trust structure, which governs
the way the information is passed on between agents:
Definition 9 (Trust) We say that an agent i trusts an agent j (and denote it by j  i ) if and
only if
Ki Kj φ =⇒ Ki φ,
for all φ.
In the Frauchiger-Renner setup, as well as in the thought experiment presented in this paper,
we consider the following trust structure between agents:
A B  U  W  A. (8)
Further discussion on axioms of modal logic and their application in quantum mechanics can be
found in our paper [6].
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B Generalized probabilistic theories
In quantum theory, systems are described by states that live in a Hilbert space, measurements and
transformations on these states are represented by CPTP maps and the Born rule specifies how
to obtain the probabilities of possible measurement outcomes give these states and measurements.
In more general theories, there is no reason to assume Hilbert spaces or CPTP maps. In fact
such a description of the state space and operations may not even be available, systems may be
described as black boxes taking in classical inputs (choice of measurements) and giving classical
outputs (measurement outcomes). What we can demand is that the theory provides a way for
agents to predict the probabilities of obtaining various outputs based on their input choice and
some operational description of the box.
Barrett derived the mathematical structure of the state-space of composite systems and allowed
operations on systems from a few reasonable, physically motivated assumptions [3]. We follow his
formalism here. Later, Gross et al. found restrictions on the reversible dynamics of maximally non-
local GPTs [5] showing that all reversible operations on box-world are trivial i.e., they map product
states to product states and cannot correlate initially uncorrelated systems. In accordance with this,
our memory update procedure that maps the initial product state PSMin (Equation 10) to the final
correlated state of the system and memory PSMfin (Equation 11 or equivalently Equation 12) is an
irreversible transformation in contrast to the quantum case where the corresponding transformation
is a unitary and hence reversible.
B.1 Observing outcomes
In Section 3, we briefly reviewed states and transformations in GPTs, in particular box world; here
we go into further detail. Consider a GPT, T. Denoting the set of all allowed states of a system in
T by S, any valid transformation on a normalised GPT state P ∈ S maps it to another normalised
GPT state in S. Consequently, is linear and can be represented by a matrixM such that P→M.P
under this transformation and M.P ∈ S [3]. Further, operations that result in different possible
outcomes can be associated with a set of transformations, one for each outcome. These also give
an operational meaning to unnormalised states where |P| = ∑i P (a = i|X = j) = c ∀j, c ∈ [0, 1]
(i.e., the norm is independent of the value of j). Such an operation M on a normalised initial state
P can be associated with a set of matrices {Mi} such that the unnormalised state corresponding
to the ith outcome is Mi.P. Then the probability of obtaining this outcome is simply the norm of
this unnormalised state, |Mi.P| and the corresponding normalized final state is Mi.P/|Mi.P|. A
set {Mi} represents a valid operation if the following hold [3].
0 ≤ |Mi.P| ≤ 1 ∀i,P ∈ S (9a)∑
i
|Mi.P| = 1 ∀P ∈ S (9b)
Mi.P ∈ S ∀i,P ∈ S (9c)
This is the analogue of quantum Born rule for GPTs. Box world is a GPT where the state space
S consists of all normalized statesP whose entries are valid probabilities (i.e., ∈ [0, 1]) and satisfy the
no-signalling constraints i.e., for aN -partite stateP, the marginal term∑ai P (a1, .., ai, .., aN |X1, .., Xi, .., XN )
is independent of the setting Xi forall i ∈ {1, ..., N}8
8This is in the spirit of relativistic causality since one would certainly expect that the input of one party does not
affect the output of others when the are all space-like separated from each other.
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When the GPT T is box world, the conditions of Equations 9a-9c result in the characterization
of measurements and transformations in the theory in terms of classical circuits or wirings as
shown in [3]. It suffices for the purpose of this paper to take that characterisation as the common
knowledge of agents in the theory. In the original quantum paradox [1], the Born rule is taken
as common knowledge and here, the common knowledge consists of characterisations that follow
from the box world analogue of the born rule (Equations 9a-9c). We summarise the results of
[3] characterising allowed transformations and measurements in box world and will only consider
normalization-preserving transformations.
• Transformations:
– Single system: All transformations on single box world systems are relabellings of fiducial
measurements or outcomes or a convex combination thereof.
– Bipartite system: Let X and Y be fiducial measurements performed on the transformed
bipartite system with corresponding outcomes a and b, then all transformations of 2-gbit
systems can be decomposed into convex combinations of classical circuits of the following
form: A fiducial measurement X ′ = f1(X,Y ) is performed on the initial state of the first
gbit resulting in the outcome a′ followed by a fiducial measurement Y ′ = f2(X,Y,X ′) on
the initial state of the second gbit resulting in the outcome b′. The final outcomes are
given as (a, b) = f3(X,Y, a′, b′), where f1, f2 and f3 are arbitrary functions.
• Meaurements:
– Single system: All measurements on single box world systems are either fiducial mea-
surements with outcomes relabelled or convex combinations of such.
– Bipartite system: All bipartite measurements on 2-gbit systems can be decomposed into
convex combinations of classical circuits of the following form (Figure 6): A fiducial
measurement X is performed on the initial state of the first gbit resulting in the outcome
a′ followed by a fiducial measurement Y = f(a′) on the second gbit resulting in the
outcome b′. The final outcome is a = f ′(a′, b′), where f and f ′ are arbitrary functions.
Remark: Note that an agent Alice who measures a box world system only sees a classical
final state, which corresponds the classical measurement outcome, since the box is a single-shot
input/output function. Alice could use Equations 9a-9c to calculate the probabilities of obtaining
different outcomes given the measurement she performs and prepare a new box (a new input/output
function) depending on the measurement and outcome she just obtained (and has stored in her
memory), as in Figure 7. An outside agent who does not know Alice’s measurement outcome would
see correlations between Alice’s system and memory and would describe the measurement by an
irreversible transformation, more specifically a classical wiring between Alice’s system and memory
as shown in the following section.
C Memory update in box world (proofs)
C.1 Single lab
In this section, we describe how a box world agent would measure a system and store the result in
a memory. From the perspective of an outside observer (who does not know the outcome of the
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agent’s measurement), we describe the initial and final states of the system and memory before and
after the measurement as well as the transformation that implements this memory update in box
world. In the quantum case, any initial state of the system S is mapped to an isomorphic joint state
of the system S and memoryM (see Equation 1) and hence the memory update map that maps the
former to the latter (an isometry in this case9) satisfies Definition 6 of an information-preserving
memory update. We will now characterise the analogous memory update map in box world and
show that it also satisfies Definition 6.
Theorem 10 In box world, there exists a valid transformation u that maps every arbitrary, nor-
malized state PSin of the system S to an isomorphic final state PSMfin of the system S and memory
M and hence constitutes an information-preserving memory update (Definition 6).
Proof: To simplify the argument, we will describe the proof for the case where S andM are gbits.
For higher dimensional systems, a similar argument holds, this will be explained at the end of the
proof.
We start with the system in an arbitrary, normalized gbit state PSin = (p 1 − p|q 1 − q)T
(where the subscript T denotes transpose and p, q ∈ [0, 1]) and the memory initialised to one of
the 4 pure states10, say PMin = P1 = (1 0|1 0)T . Then the joint initial state, PSMin = (p 1 −
p|q 1 − q)TS ⊗ (1 0|1 0)TM of the system and memory can be written as follows, where Pin(a =
i, a′ = j|X = k,X ′ = l) denotes the probability of obtaining the outcomes a = i and a′ = j when
performing the fiducial measurements X = k and X ′ = l on the system and memory respectively,
in the initial state PSMin .
PSMin =

Pin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 1)
Pin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 1)

SM
=

p
0
1− p
0
p
0
1− p
0
q
0
1− q
0
q
0
1− q
0

SM
(10)
The rest of the proof proceeds as follows: we first describe a final state PSMfin of the system
and memory and a corresponding memory update map u that satisfy Definition 6 of a generalized
9An isometry since it introduces an initial pure state on M , followed by a joint unitary on SM .
10It does not matter which pure state the memory is initialized in, a similar argument applies in all cases.
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information-preserving memory update. Then, we show that this map is an allowed box world
transformation which completes the proof.
If an agent performs a measurement on the system, the state of the memory must be updated
depending on the outcome and the final state of the system and memory after the measurement
must hence be a correlated (i.e., a non-product) state. Although the full state space of the 2 gbit
system SM is characterised by the 4 fiducial measurements (X,X ′) ∈ {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)},
Definition 6 allows us to restrict possible final states to a useful subspace of this state space that
contain correlated states of a certain form. The definition requires that for every map ES on the
system before measurement, there exists a corresponding map ESM on the system and memory after
the measurement that is operationally identical. Thus it suffices if the joint final state PSMfin belongs
to a subspace of the 2 gbit state space for which only 2 of the 4 fiducial measurements are relevant
for characterising the state, namely any 2 fiducial measurements on PSMfin that are isomorphic to
the 2 fiducial measurements on PSin. Note that by definition of fiducial measurements, the outcome
probabilities of any measurement can be found given the outcome probabilities of all the fiducial
measurements and without loss of generality, we will only consider the case where the agents perform
fiducial measurements on their systems.
A natural isomorphism between fiducial measurements on PSin and those on PSMfin to consider
here (in analogy with the quantum case) is: X = i ⇔ (X,X ′) = (i, i) , ∀i ∈ {0, 1} i.e., only
consider the cases where the fiducial measurements performed on S and M are the same. Now,
in order for the states to be isomorphic or operationally equivalent, one requires that performing
the fiducial measurements (X,X ′) = (i, i) on PSMfin should give the same outcome statistics as
measuring X = 0 on PSin. This can be satisfied through an identical isomorphism on the outcomes:
a = i⇔ (a, a′) = (i, i) , ∀i ∈ {0, 1}. Then the final state of the system and memory, PSMfin will be
of the form
PSMfin =

Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 0, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 0)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 0, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 0|X = 1, X ′ = 1)
Pfin(a = 1, a′ = 1|X = 1, X ′ = 1)

SM
=

p
0
0
1− p
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
∗
q
0
0
1− q

SM
, (11)
where ∗ are arbitrary, normalised entries and where Pfin(a = i, a′ = j|X = k,X ′ = l) denotes the
probability of obtaining the outcomes a = i and a′ = j when performing the fiducial measurements
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X = k and X ′ = l on the system and memory respectively, in the final state PSMfin . This final state
can be compressed since the only relevant and non-zero probabilities in PSMfin occur when X = X ′
and a = a′. We can then define new variables X˜ and a˜ such that X = X ′ = i ⇔ X˜ = i and
a = a′ = j ⇔ a˜ = j for i, j ∈ {0, 1} and PSMfin can equivalently be written as in Equation 12 which
is clearly of the same form as PSin.
PSMfin ≡

P (a˜ = 0|X˜ = 0)
P (a˜ = 1|X˜ = 0)
P (a˜ = 0|X˜ = 1)
P (a˜ = 1|X˜ = 1)

SM
=

p
1− p
q
1− q

SM
(12)
Hence the initial state of the system, PSin = (p 1 − p|q 1 − q)T (which is an arbitrary gbit
state) is isomorphic to the final state of the system and memory, PSMfin (as evident from Equation 12)
with the same outcome probabilities for X = 0, 1 and X˜ = 0, 1. This implies that for every
transformation ES on the former, there exists a transformation ESM on the latter such that for
all outside agents Aj and for all p, q ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., all possible input gbit states on the system),
Kjφ[ES(PSin)] ⇒ Kjφ[ESM ◦ PSMfin], where PfinSM = u(PinS ). Thus any map u that maps PinS to
PfinSM satisfies Definition 6.
We now find a valid box world transformation that maps the initial state PSMin (Equation 10)
to any final state of the form PSMfin (Equation 11). This fully characterises the memory update map
u : PinS → PfinSM since PSMin is obtained from PSin by simply tensoring a pure state (1 0|1 0)TM .
Noting that all bipartite transformations in box world can be decomposed to a classical circuit
of a certain form (see Appendix B.1 or the original paper [3] for details), In Figure 10, we construct
an explicit circuit of this form that converts PSMin to PSMfin .By construction, we only need to consider
the case of X = X ′ since for X 6= X ′, the entries of PSMfin can be arbitrary and are irrelevant to
the argument. For X 6= X ′, one can consider any such circuit description and it is easy to see that
PSMin = (p 1 − p|q 1 − q)TS ⊗ (1 0|1 0)TM is indeed transformed into PSMfin = (p 0 0 1 −
p| ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗| ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗|q 0 0 1 − q)TSM through the transformation T defined by these
sequence of steps. For example, if the circuit description for the X 6= X ′ case is same as that for the
X = X ′ case, then the resultant memory update map is equivalent to the circuit of Figure 9a which
corresponds to performing a fixed measurement X ′ = 0 on the initial state of M and a classical
CNOT on the output wire of M controlled by the output wire of S11. The final state in that case is
(p 0 0 1− p|p 0 0 1− p|q 0 0 1− q|q 0 0 1− q)TSM . Note that the memory update
transformation T : PSMin → PSMfin and hence the resulting map u are not reversible. This is expected
since the initial state PSMin is a product state while the final state PSMfin clearly is not (since S and
M are correlated for an outside observer), and [5] shows that all reversible transformations in box
world map product states to product states.
11The output wires of boxes carry classical information after the measurement.
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X1 = X X2 = 0
X X′
X1 X2
S M
a2
a = a1
a′ = a2 ⊕ a1
PSMfin
a a′
a1
PSin
 10
1
0

M
Figure 10: Classical circuit decomposition of memory update transformation T : The blue
box represents the final state of the system S and memoryM after the memory update characterised
by the fiducial measurements X and X ′ and the outcomes a, a′. Let T be the memory update
transformation that maps the initial state PSMin to a final state PSMfin . Noting that we only need
to consider the case of X = X ′ since the for X 6= X ′, the entries of PSMfin can be arbitrary, the
action of T is eqivalent to the circuit shown here i.e., 1) Choose X1 = X(= X ′) and perform
this fiducial measurement on the initial state of the system PSin to obtain the outcome a1. 2) Fix
X2 = 0 (or X2 = 1) and perform this fiducial measurement on the initial state of the memory
PMin = (1 0|1 0)TM to obtain the outcome a2. 3) Set a = a1. 4) If a1 = 1, set a′ = a2, otherwise
set a′ = a2 ⊕ 1, where ⊕ denotes modulo 2 addition.
For higher dimensional systems S with n > 2 fiducial measurements, X ∈ {0, ..., n − 1} and
k > 2 outcomes taking values a ∈ {0, ..., k − 1}, let bn and bk be the number of bits required to
represent n and k in binary respectively. Then the memory M would be initialized to bk copies
of the pure state PMin,n = (1 0|...|1 0)TM which contains n identical blocks (one for each of the n
fiducial measurements). One can then perform the procedure of Figure 10 ”bitwise" combining each
output bit with one pure state of M and apply the same argument to obtain the result. For the
specific case of the memory update transformation of Figure 9a, this would correspond to a bitwise
CNOT on the output wires of S and M . 
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C.2 Two labs sharing initial correlations
So far, we have considered a single agent measuring a system in her lab. We can also consider
situations where multiple agents jointly share a state and measure their local parts of the state,
updating their corresponding memories. One might wonder whether the initial correlations in the
shared state are preserved once the agents measure it to update their memories (clearly the local
measurement probabilities remain unaltered as we saw in this section). The answer is affirmative
and this is what allows us to formulate the Frauchiger-Renner paradox in box world as done in the
Section 4, even though a coherent copy analogous to the quantum case does not exist here.
Theorem 11 Suppose that Alice and Bob share an arbitrary bipartite state PPRin (which may be
correlated), locally perform a fiducial measurement on their half of the state and store the outcome
in their local memories A and B. Then the final joint state PA˜B˜fin of the systems A˜ := PA and
B˜ := RB as described by outside agents is isomorphic to PPRin with the systems A˜ and B˜ taking the
role of the systems P and R i.e., local memory updates by Alice and Bob preserve any correlations
initially shared between them.
Proof: In the following, we describe the proof for the case where the bipartite system shared
by Alice and Bob consists of 2 gbits, however, the result easily generalises to arbitrary higher
dimensional systems by the argument presented in the last paragraph of the proof of Theorem 10.
Let PPRin be an arbitrary 2 gbit state with entries Pin(ab = ij|XY = kl) (i, j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}),
which correspond to the joint probabilities of Alice and Bob obtaining the outcomes a = i and b = j
when measuring X = k and Y = l on the P and R subsystems when sharing that initial state.
Let X ′, a′ ∈ {0, 1} and Y ′, b′ ∈ {0, 1} be the fiducial measurements and outcomes for the memory
systems A and B (also gbits) respectively. We describe the measurement and memory update
process for each agent separately and characterise the final state of Alice’s and Bob’s systems and
memories after the process as would appear to outside agents who do not have access to Alice
and Bob’s measurement outcomes. This analysis does not depend on the order in which Alice and
Bob perform the measurement as the correlations are symmetric between them, so without loss of
generality, we can consider Bob’s measurement first and then Alice’s.
Suppose that Bob’s memory B is initialised to the state PBin = PB1 = (1 0|1 0)TB. Then
the joint initial state of the Alice’s and Bob’s system and Bob’s memory as described by an agent
Wigner outside Bob’s lab is PPRBin = PPRin ⊗PB1 . This can be expanded as follows where Pin(abb′ =
ijk|XY Y ′ = lmn) represents the probability of obtaining the binary outcomes a = i,b = j,b′ = k
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when performing the binary fiducial measurements X = l,Y = m,Y ′ = n on the initial state PPRBin .
PPRBin =

Pin(abb′ = 000|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 001|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 010|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 011|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 100|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 101|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 110|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pin(abb′ = 111|XY Y ′ = 000)
·
·
·
Pin(abb′ = 000|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 001|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 010|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 011|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 100|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 101|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 110|XY Y ′ = 111)
Pin(abb′ = 111|XY Y ′ = 111)

PRB
=

Pin(ab = 00|XY = 00)
0
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 00)
0
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 00)
0
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 00)
0
·
·
·
Pin(ab = 00|XY = 11)
0
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 11)
0
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 11)
0
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 11)

PRB
(13)
PPRBin has 8 blocks GXY Y ′ , one for each value of (X,Y, Y ′) and is a product state with 4 equal pairs
of blocks, Gin000 = Gin001,Gin010 = Gin011, Gin100 = Gin101, Gin110 = Gin111 since both measurements on the
initial state of B give the same outcome.
Now, the outside observer Wigner will describe the transformation on RB through the memory
update transformation T of Figure 10. Let PPRBfin be the final state that results by applying this
map to the systems RB in the initial state PPRBin . Any transformation on a system characterised by
n fiducial measurements with k outcomes each can be represented by a nk×nk block matrix where
each block is a k × k matrix (see [3] for further details), for the system RB, n = k = 4 and the
memory update transformation TRB would be a 16 × 16 block matrix of the following form where
each Tij is a 4× 4 matrix.
TRB =

T11 · · · T14
· ·
· ·
· ·
T41 · · · T44

RB
Here, the first 4 rows decide the entries in the first block of the transformed matrix, the next 4,
the second block and so on. Noting that the memory update transformation (Figure 10) merely
permutes elements within the relevant blocks (and does not mix elements between different blocks),
the only non-zero blocks of TRB are the diagonal ones Tii. Further, by the same argument as in
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Theorem 10, the only relevant entries in the transformed state are when the same fiducial mea-
surement is performed on Bob’s system R and memory B i.e., only cases where Y = Y ′. The
remaining measurement choices maybe arbitrary for the final state (just as they are for X 6= X ′ in
Equation 11). This means that among the 4 diagonal blocks, only 2 of them are relevant. The 4
fiducial measurements on RB are Y Y ′ = 00, 01, 10, 11 and in that order, only the first and fourth
are relevant since they correspond to Y = Y ′. Within these relevant blocks (in this case T11 and
T44), the operation is a CNOT on the output b′ controlled by the output b and we have the following
matrix representation of the memory update map T of Figure 1012.
TRB =

CN 0 0 0
0 ∗ 0 0
0 0 ∗ 0
0 0 0 CN

RB
, CN =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
 (14)
where 0 represents the 4 × 4 null matrix and blocks labelled ∗ can be arbitrary. The final state
PPRBfin as seen by Wigner is then
PPRBfin = (IP ⊗ TRB)PPRBin = (IP ⊗ TRB)
[
PPRin ⊗

1
0
1
0

B
]
, (15)
where IP is the identity transformation on the P system. Since the CN blocks are the only
relevant blocks in TRB and each block of PPRBin has the same pattern of non-zero and zero entries
(Equation 13), it is enough to look at the action of IP ⊗ CN on the first block Gin000 of PPRBin .
Noting that IP is a 2× 2 identity matrix, we have
12The memory update map corresponding to the circuit of Figure 9a is a specific case of this map where the
arbitrary blocks ∗ are also equal to CN
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(IP ⊗ CN)Gin000 =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0


Pin(ab = 00|XY = 00)
0
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 00)
0
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 00)
0
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 00)
0

= Gfin000
=

Pin(ab = 00|XY = 00)
0
0
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 00)
0
0
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 00)

=

Pfin(abb′ = 000|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 001|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 010|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 011|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 100|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 101|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 110|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(abb′ = 111|XY Y ′ = 000)

,
where Pfin(abb′ = ijk|XY Y ′ = lmn) represents the probability of obtaining the outcomes a =
i,b = j,b′ = k when performing the fiducial measurements X = l,Y = m,Y ′ = n on the final state
PPRBfin and G
fin
000 is the first block of this final state. Clearly the only non-zero outcome probabilities
are when b = b′ and this allows us to compress the final state by defining b˜ = i ⇔ b = b′ = i for
i ∈ {0, 1} and we have the following.
(IP ⊗ CN)Gin000 ≡

Pin(ab = 00|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 00)
 =

Pfin(ab˜ = 00|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(ab˜ = 01|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(ab˜ = 10|XY Y ′ = 000)
Pfin(ab˜ = 11|XY Y ′ = 000)
 = Gin00
Here Gin00 is the first block of the initial state PPRin and we have that the first block of the final
state of PRB is equivalent (up to zero entries) to the first block of the initial state over PR alone
or Gfin000 = Gin00. Among the 8 blocks of PPRBfin , only the 4 blocks G
fin
000,G
fin
011,G
fin
100 and G
fin
111 are the
relevant ones (since Y = Y ′ for these) and we can similarly show that Gfin011 ≡ Gin01,Gfin100 ≡ Gin10 and
Gfin111 ≡ Gin11 for the remaining 3 relevant blocks. Defining Y˜ = i ⇔ Y = Y ′ = i for i ∈ {0, 1}, we
obtain
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PPRBfin = PPB˜fin ≡

Pfin(ab˜ = 00|XY˜ = 00)
Pfin(ab˜ = 01|XY˜ = 00)
Pfin(ab˜ = 10|XY˜ = 00)
Pfin(ab˜ = 11|XY˜ = 00)
Pfin(ab˜ = 00|XY˜ = 01)
Pfin(ab˜ = 01|XY˜ = 01)
Pfin(ab˜ = 10|XY˜ = 01)
Pfin(ab˜ = 11|XY˜ = 01)
Pfin(ab˜ = 00|XY˜ = 10)
Pfin(ab˜ = 01|XY˜ = 10)
Pfin(ab˜ = 10|XY˜ = 10)
Pfin(ab˜ = 11|XY˜ = 10)
Pfin(ab˜ = 00|XY˜ = 11)
Pfin(ab˜ = 01|XY˜ = 11)
Pfin(ab˜ = 10|XY˜ = 11)
Pfin(ab˜ = 11|XY˜ = 11)

=

Pin(ab = 00|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 00)
Pin(ab = 00|XY = 01)
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 01)
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 01)
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 01)
Pin(ab = 00|XY = 10)
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 10)
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 10)
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 10)
Pin(ab = 00|XY = 11)
Pin(ab = 01|XY = 11)
Pin(ab = 10|XY = 11)
Pin(ab = 11|XY = 11)

= PPRin (16)
Equation 16 shows that final state PPB˜fin of Alice’s system P , Bob’s system R and Bob’s memory B
after Bob’s local memory update is isomorphic to the initial state PPRin shared by Alice and Bob,
having the same outcome probabilities as the latter for all the relevant measurements. Thus the
initial correlations present in PPRin are preserved after Bob locally updates his memory according
to the update procedure of Figure 10. One can now repeat the same argument for Alice’s local
memory update taking PPB˜fin ⊗ (1 0|1 0)TA to be the initial state and by analogously defining
s˜ = i ⇔ s = s′ = i for s ∈ {a,X},i ∈ {0, 1}, we have the required result that the final state
after both parties perform their local memory updates (as described by outside agents Ursula and
Wigner) is isomorphic and operationally equivalent to the initial state shared by the parties before
the memory update.
PPARBfin = PA˜B˜fin ≡ PPRin (17)

D Quantum measurements in GPT language
In the PR box analysis, we encounter a peculiarity which is specific to measurement procedures
in GPTs: the box “disappears” after it is measured. This can become a problem when, during the
course of the experiment, the observer measuring the box has to be measured together with the box.
This is the case in the original Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment. However, this issue can in
principle be avoided, if one adapts the description of the experiment to the mentioned peculiarity:
as soon as the agent measures the box, and it subsequently disappears, she prepares a new box for
the observer on the outside to measure. For example, when Alice measures the box P , she can not
only prepare a box Ra for Bob to measure (Figure 11a), but also one for Wigner, meant to contain
correlations of the Bob’s lab (Figure 11c). Similarly, from Bob’s point of view, he prepares a box
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PAb for Ursula to measure (Figure 11b); and, finally, as seen from the outside, Ursula and Wigner
measure boxes PAb and RBa, prepared for them by Bob and Alice (Figure 11d).
P
z
a
Ra
z
b
(a) Alice’s viewpoint: Alice measures the box P
and prepares a box Ra for Bob to measure.
R
z
b
PAb
x
u
(b) Bob’s viewpoint: Bob measures the box R
and prepares a box PAb for Ursula to measure.
P
z
a
RBa
z
w
(c) Alice’s viewpoint: after measuring the box
P , she also prepares a box RBa for Wigner to
measure.
PA RB
x x
u w
(d) Ursula’s and Wigner’s viewpoints: they
measure boxes PA and RB respectively.
Figure 11: Viewpoints of different agents for quantum measurements in GPTs.
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